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Abstract: Since 2016, when the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal began to emerge, public
concern has grown around the threat of “online manipulation”. While these worries are familiar
to privacy researchers, this paper aims to make them more salient to policymakers—first, by
defining  “online  manipulation”,  thus  enabling  identification of  manipulative  practices;  and
second, by drawing attention to the specific harms online manipulation threatens. We argue that
online manipulation is the use of information technology to covertly influence another person’s
decision-making, by targeting and exploiting their decision-making vulnerabilities. Engaging in
such practices can harm individuals by diminishing their economic interests, but its deeper,
more insidious harm is its challenge to individual autonomy. We explore this autonomy harm,
emphasising its  implications for  both individuals  and society,  and we briefly  outline some
strategies for combating online manipulation and strengthening autonomy in an increasingly
digital world.
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Public concern is growing around an issue previously discussed predominantly amongst privacy
and  surveillance  scholars—namely,  the  ability  of  data  collectors  to  use  information  about
individuals to manipulate them (e.g., Abramowitz, 2017; Doubek, 2017; Vayena, 2018). Knowing
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(or inferring) a person’s preferences, interests,  and habits,  their friends and acquaintances,
education and employment, bodily health and financial standing, puts the knower in a position
to exercise considerable influence over the known (Richards, 2013).1 It enables them to better
understand what motivates their targets, what their weaknesses and vulnerabilities are, when
they are most susceptible to influence and how most effectively to frame pitches and appeals.2
Because information technology makes generating, collecting, analysing, and leveraging such
data about us cheap and easy, and at a scarcely comprehendible scale, the worry is that such
technologies render us deeply vulnerable to the whims of those who build, control, and deploy
these systems.
Initially, for academics studying this problem, that meant the whims of advertisers, as these
technologies  were  largely  developed  by  firms  like  Google  and  Facebook,  who  identified
advertising as a means of monetising the troves of personal information they collect about
internet users (Zuboff, 2015). Accordingly, for some time, scholarly worries centred (rightly) on
commercial  advertising practices,  and policy solutions focused on modernising privacy and
consumer protection regulations to account for the new capabilities of data-driven advertising
technologies (e.g., Calo, 2014; Nadler & McGuigan, 2018; Turow, 2012).3 As Ryan Calo put it,
“the digitization of commerce dramatically alters the capacity of firms to influence consumers at
a  personal  level.  A  specific  set  of  emerging  technologies  and  techniques  will  empower
corporations to discover and exploit the limits of each individual consumer’s ability to pursue
his or her own self-interest” (2014, p. 999).
More recently, however, the scope of these worries has expanded. After concerns were raised in
2016 and 2017 about the use of information technology to influence elections around the world,
many began to reckon with the fact that the threat of targeted advertising is not limited to the
commercial  sphere.4  By harnessing ad targeting platforms,  like those offered by Facebook,
YouTube, and other social media services, political campaigns can exert meaningful influence
over  the  decision-making  and  behaviour  of  voters  (Vaidhyanathan,  2018;  Yeung,  2017;
Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). Global outrage over the Cambridge Analytica scandal—in
which the data analytics  firm was accused of  profiling voters in the United States,  United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and elsewhere, and targeting them with advertisements designed to
exploit their “inner demons”—brought such worries to the forefront of public consciousness
(“Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal so Far”, 2018; see also, Abramowitz, 2017;
Doubek, 2017; Vayena, 2018).
Indeed, there is evidence that the pendulum is swinging well to the other side. Rather than
condemning  the  particular  harms  wrought  in  particular  contexts  by  strategies  of  online
influence, scholars are beginning to turn their attention to the big picture. In their recent book
Re-Engineering Humanity, Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger describe a vast array of related
phenomena, which they collectively term “techno-social engineering”—i.e.,  “processes where
technologies and social forces align and impact how we think, perceive, and act” (2018, p. 4).
Operating at a grand scale reminiscent of mid-20th  century technology critique (like that of
Lewis Mumford or  Jacques Ellul),  Frischmann and Selinger point  to  cases of  technologies
transforming the way we carry out and understand our lives—from “micro-level” to the “meso-
level” and “macro-level”— capturing everything from fitness tracking to self-driving cars to viral
media  (2018,  p.  270).  Similarly,  in  her  book  The  Age  of  Surveillance  Capitalism (2019),
Shoshana Zuboff raises the alarm about the use of information technology to effectuate what she
calls  “behavior  modification”,  arguing  that  it  has  become  so  pervasive,  so  central  to  the
functioning of the modern information economy, that we have entered a new epoch in the
history of political economy.
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These efforts help to highlight the fact that there is something much deeper at stake here than
unfair commerce. When information about us is used to influence our decision-making, it does
more than diminish our interests—it threatens our autonomy.5 At the same time, there is value
in  limiting  the  scope  of  the  analysis.  The  notions  of  “techno-social  engineering”  and
“surveillance capitalism” are too big to wield surgically—the former is intended to reveal a basic
truth about the nature of our human relationship with technology, and the latter identifies a
broad  set  of  economic  imperatives  currently  structuring  technology  development  and  the
technology industry.6  Complementing this work, our intervention aims smaller. For the last
several years, public outcry has coalesced against a particular set of abuses effectuated through
information technology—what many refer to as “online manipulation” (e.g., Abramowitz, 2017;
Doubek, 2017; Vayena, 2018). In what follows, we theorise and vindicate this grievance.7
In the first section, we define manipulation, distinguishing it from neighbouring concepts like
persuasion, coercion, deception, and nudging, and we explain why information technology is so
well-suited to facilitating manipulation. In the second section, we describe the harms of online
manipulation—the  use  of  information  technology  to  manipulate—focusing  primarily  on  its
threat to individual autonomy. Finally, we suggest directions for future policy efforts aimed at
curbing online manipulation and strengthening autonomy in human-technology relations.
1. WHAT IS ONLINE MANIPULATION?
The term “manipulation” is used, colloquially, to designate a wide variety of activities, so before
jumping in it is worth narrowing the scope of our intervention further. In the broadest sense,
manipulating  something  simply  means  steering  or  controlling  it.  We  talk  about  doctors
manipulating fine instruments during surgery and pilots manipulating cockpit controls during
flight. “Manipulation” is also used to describe attempts at steering or controlling institutions
and systems. For example, much has been written of late about allegations made (and evidence
presented) that internet trolls under the authority of the Russian government attempted to
manipulate the US media during the 2016 presidential election.8 Further, many suspect that the
goal  of  those efforts  was,  in turn,  to manipulate the election itself  (by influencing voters).
However, at the centre of this story, and at the centre of stories like it, is the worry that people
are being manipulated, that individual decision-making is being steered or controlled, and that
the capacity of individuals to make independent choices is therefore being compromised. It is
manipulation  in  this  sense—the  attempt  to  influence  individual  decision-making  and
behaviour—that we focus on in what follows.
Philosophers and political theorists have long struggled to define manipulation. According to
Robert Noggle, there are three main proposals (Noggle, 2018b). Some argue that manipulation
is  non-rational  influence  (Wood,  2014).  On  that  account,  manipulating  someone  means
influencing  them by  circumventing  their  rational,  deliberative  decision-making  faculties.  A
classic example of manipulation understood in this way is subliminal messaging, and depending
on one’s conception of rationality we might also imagine certain kinds of emotional appeals,
such as guilt trips, as fitting into this picture. The second approach defines manipulation as a
form of pressure, as in cases of blackmail (Kligman & Culver, 1992, qtd. in Noggle, 2018b). Here
the idea is  that  manipulation involves some amount of  force—a cost  is  extracted for  non-
compliance—but not so much force as to rise to the level of coercion. Finally, a third proposal
defines manipulation as trickery. Although a variety of subtly distinct accounts fall under this
umbrella,  the  main  idea  is  that  manipulation,  at  bottom,  means  leading  someone  along,
inducing them to behave as the manipulator wants,  like Iago in Shakespeare’s  Othello,  by
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tempting them, insinuating, stoking jealousy, and so on.9
Each of these theories of manipulation has strengths and weaknesses, and our account shares
certain features in common with all of them. It hews especially close to the trickery view, but
operationalises the notion of trickery more concretely,  thus offering more specific tools for
diagnosing cases of manipulation. In our view, manipulation is hidden influence. Or more fully,
manipulating someone means intentionally and covertly influencing their decision-making, by
targeting  and  exploiting  their  decision-making  vulnerabilities.  Covertly  influencing
someone—imposing  a  hidden  influence—means  influencing  them  in  a  way  they  aren’t
consciously aware of, and in a way they couldn’t easily become aware of were they to try and
understand what was impacting their decision-making process.
Understanding manipulation as hidden influence helps to distinguish it from other forms of
influence. In what follows, we distinguish it first from persuasion and coercion, and then from
deception and nudging. Persuasion—in the sense of rational persuasion—means attempting to
influence someone by offering reasons they can think about and evaluate.10 Coercion means
influencing someone by constraining their options, such that their only rational course of action
is the one the coercer intends (Wood, 2014).  Persuasion and coercion carry very different,
indeed nearly opposite, normative connotations: persuading someone to do something is almost
always acceptable, while coercing them almost always isn’t. Yet persuasion and coercion are
alike in that they are both forthright forms of influence. When someone is trying to persuade us
or trying to coerce us we usually know it. Manipulation, by contrast, is hidden—we only learn
that someone was trying to steer our decision-making after the fact, if we ever find out at all.
What  makes  manipulation distinctive,  then,  is  the  fact  that  when we learn we have  been
manipulated we feel played.11 Reflecting back on why we behaved the way we did, we realise that
at the time of decision we didn’t understand our own motivations. We were like puppets, strung
along  by  a  puppet  master.  Manipulation  thus  disrupts  our  capacity  for  self-authorship—it
presumes to decide for us how and why we ought to live. As we discuss in what follows, this
gives rise to a specific set of harms. For now, what is important to see is the kind of influence at
issue here. Unlike persuasion and coercion, which address their targets openly, manipulation is
covert.  When we are  coerced we are  usually  rightly  upset  about  it,  but  the  object  of  our
indignation is the set of constraints placed upon us. When we are manipulated, by contrast, we
are not constrained. Rather, we are directed, outside our conscious awareness, to act for reasons
we can’t recognise, and toward ends we may wish to avoid.
Given this picture, one can detect a hint of deception. On our view, deception is a special case of
manipulation—one way to covertly influence someone is to plant false beliefs. If, for example, a
manipulator wanted their partner to clean the house, they could lie and tell them that their
mother was coming for a visit, thereby tricking them into doing what they wanted by prompting
them to make a rational decision premised on false beliefs. But deception is not the only species
of manipulation; there are other ways to exert hidden influence. First, manipulators need not
focus on beliefs at all. Instead, they can covertly influence by subtly tempting, guilting, seducing,
or otherwise playing upon desires and emotions. As long as the target of manipulation is not
conscious of the manipulator’s strategy while they are deploying it, it is “hidden” in the relevant
sense.
Some argue that even overt temptation, guilting, and so on are manipulative (these arguments
are often made by proponents of the “non-rational influence” view of manipulation, described
above),  though  they  almost  always  concede  that  such  strategies  are  more  effective  when
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concealed.12  We  suspect  that  what  is  usually  happening  in  such  cases  is  a  manipulator
attempting to covertly tempt, guilt, etc., but failing to successfully hide their strategy. On our
account, it is the attempted covertness that is central to manipulation, rather than the particular
strategy, because once one learns that they are the target of another person’s influence that
knowledge becomes a  regular  part  of  their  decision-making process.  We are all  constantly
subject to myriad influences; the reason we do not feel constantly manipulated is that we can
usually reflect on, understand, and account for those influences in the process of reaching our
own decisions about how to act (Raz, 1986, p. 204). The influences become part of how we
explain to ourselves why we make the decisions we do. When the influence is hidden, however,
that  process  is  undermined.  Thus,  while  we  might  naturally  call  a  person who frequently
engages in overt temptation or seduction manipulative—meaning, they frequently attempt to
manipulate—strictly speaking we would only say that they have succeeded in manipulating when
their target is unaware of their machinations.
Second, behavioural economists have catalogued a long list of “cognitive biases”—unreliable
mental shortcuts we use in everyday decision-making—which can be leveraged by would-be
manipulators to influence the trajectory of our decision-making by shaping our beliefs, without
the need for outright deception.13 Manipulators can frame information in a way that disposes us
to a certain interpretation of the facts; they can strategically “anchor” our frame of reference
when evaluating the costs or benefits of some decision; they can indicate to us that others have
decided a certain way, in order to cue our intrinsic disposition to social conformity (the so-called
“bandwagon effect”); and so on. Indeed, though deception and playing on people’s desires and
emotions have likely been the most common forms of manipulation in the past—which is to say,
the most common strategies for covertly influencing people—as we explain in what follows,
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  exploiting  cognitive  biases  and  vulnerabilities  is  the  most
alarming problem confronting us today.14
Talk of exploiting cognitive vulnerabilities inevitably gives rise to questions about nudging, thus
finally, we briefly distinguish between nudging and manipulation. The idea of “nudging”, as is
well known, comes from the work of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, and points to any
intentional alteration of another person’s decision-making context (their “choice architecture”)
made in order to influence their decision-making outcome (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). For
Thaler and Sunstein, the fact that we suffer from so many decision-making vulnerabilities, that
our decision-making processes are inalterably and unavoidably susceptible to even the subtlest
cues from the contexts in which they are situated, suggests that when we design other people’s
choice-making environments—from the apps they use to find a restaurant to the menus they
order from after they arrive—we can’t  help but influence their decisions. As such, on their
account, we might as well use that power for good, by steering people’s decisions in ways that
benefit  them individually and all  of  us collectively.  For these reasons, Thaler and Sunstein
recommend  a  variety  of  nudges,  from setting  defaults  that  encourage  people  to  save  for
retirement to arranging options in a cafeteria in way that encourages people to eat healthier
foods.15
Given our definition of manipulation as intentionally hidden influence, and our suggestion that
influences are frequently hidden precisely by leveraging decision-making vulnerabilities like the
cognitive biases nudge advocates reference, the question naturally arises as to whether or not
nudges are manipulative. Much has been written on this topic and no consensus has been
reached (see, e.g., Bovens, 2009; Hausman & Welch, 2010; Noggle, 2018a; Nys & Engelen, 2017;
Reach, 2016; Selinger & Whyte, 2011; Sunstein, 2016). In part, this likely has to do with the fact
that a wide and disparate variety of changes to choice architectures are described as nudges. In
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our view, some are manipulative and some are not—the distinction hinging on whether or not
the nudge is hidden, and whether it exploits vulnerabilities or attempts to rectify them. Many of
the nudges Thaler and Sunstein, and others, recommend are not hidden and work to correct
cognitive bias. For example, purely informational nudges, such as nutrition labels, do not seem
to us to be manipulative. They encourage individuals to slow down, reflect on, and make more
informed  decisions.  By  contrast,  Thaler  and  Sunstein’s  famous  cafeteria  nudge—placing
healthier  foods  at  eye-level  and  less  healthy  foods  below  or  above—seems  plausibly
manipulative, since it attempts to operate outside the individual’s conscious awareness, and to
leverage a decision-making bias. Of course, just because it’s manipulative does not mean it isn’t
justified. To say that a strategy is manipulative is to draw attention to the fact that it carries a
harm, which we discuss in detail below. It is possible, however, that the harm is justified by
some greater benefit it brings with it.
Having  defined  manipulation  as  hidden  or  covert  influence,  and  having  distinguished
manipulation from persuasion, coercion, deception, and nudging, it is possible to define “online
manipulation” as the use of  information technology to covertly influence another person’s
decision-making, by targeting and exploiting decision-making vulnerabilities. Importantly, we
have adopted the term “online manipulation” from public discourse and interpret the word
“online” expansively, recognising that there is no longer any hard boundary between online and
offline  life  (if  there  ever  was).  “Online  manipulation”,  as  we  understand  it,  designates
manipulation facilitated by information technology, and could just as easily be termed “digital
manipulation” or “automated manipulation”. Since traditionally “offline” spaces are increasingly
digitally  mediated  (because  the  people  occupying  them  carry  smartphones,  the  spaces
themselves are embedded with internet-connected sensors, and so on), we should expect to
encounter online manipulation beyond our computer screens.
Given this definition, it is not difficult to see why information technology is uniquely suited to
facilitating  manipulative  influences.  First,  pervasive  digital  surveillance  puts  our  decision-
making vulnerabilities on permanent display. As privacy scholars have long pointed out, nearly
everything we do today leaves a digital trace, and data collectors compile those traces into
enormously detailed profiles  (Solove,  2004).  Such profiles  comprise information about our
demographics, finances, employment, purchasing behaviour, engagement with public services
and institutions, and so on—in total, they often involve thousands of data points about each
individual.  By  analysing  patterns  latent  in  this  data,  advertisers  and  others  engaging  in
behavioural targeting are able to detect when and how to intervene in order to most effectively
influence us (Kaptein & Eckles, 2010).
Moreover, digital surveillance enables detection of increasingly individual- or person-specific
vulnerabilities.16 Beyond the well-known cognitive biases discussed above (e.g., anchoring and
framing effects), which condition most people’s decision-making to some degree, we are also
each subject to particular circumstances that can impact how we choose.17 We are each prone to
specific fears, anxieties, hopes, and desires, as well as physical, material, and economic realities,
which—if known—can be used to steer our decision-making. In 2016, the voter micro-targeting
firm Cambridge Analytica claimed to construct advertisements appealing to particular voter
“psychometric” traits (such as openness, extraversion, etc.) by combining information about
social  media  use  with  personality  profiles  culled  from online  quizzes.18  And  in  2017,  an
Australian newspaper exposed internal Facebook strategy documents detailing the company’s
alleged ability to detect when teenage users are feeling insecure. According to the report, “By
monitoring posts, pictures, interactions and internet activity in real-time, Facebook can work
out when young people feel ‘stressed’, ‘defeated’, ‘overwhelmed’, ‘anxious’, ‘nervous’, ‘stupid’,
Technology, autonomy, and manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 7 June 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 2
‘silly’, ‘useless’, and a ‘failure’” (Davidson, 2017). Though Facebook claims it never used that
information to target advertisements at teenagers, it did not deny that it could. Extrapolating
from this example it is easy to imagine others, such as banks targeting advertisements for high-
interest  loans  at  the  financially  desperate  or  pharmaceutical  companies  targeting
advertisements  for  drugs  at  those  suspected  to  be  in  health  crisis.19
Second, digital platforms, such as websites and smartphone applications, are the ideal medium
for  leveraging  these  insights  into  our  decision-making  vulnerabilities.  They  are  dynamic,
interactive, intrusive, and adaptive choice architectures (Lanzing, 2018; Susser, 2019b; Yeung,
2017). Which is to say, the digital interfaces we interact with are configured in real time using
the information about us described above, and they continue to learn about us as we interact
with them. Unlike advertisements of old, they do not wait, passively, for viewers to drive past
them on roads or browse over them in magazines; rather, they send text messages and push
notifications, demanding our attention, and appear in our social media feeds at the precise
moment they are most likely to tempt us. And because all of this is automated, digital platforms
are able to adapt to each individual user, creating what Karen Yeung calls “highly personalised
choice  environment[s]”—decision-making  contexts  in  which  the  vulnerabilities  catalogued
through pervasive digital surveillance are put to work in an effort to influence our choices (2017,
p. 122).20
Third,  if  manipulation  is  hidden influence,  then digital  technologies  are  ideal  vehicles  for
manipulation because they are already in a real sense hidden. We often think of technologies as
objects we attend to and use with focus and attention. The language of technology design reflects
this:  we  talk  about  “users”  and  “end  users,”  “user  interfaces,”  and  “human-computer
interaction”. In fact, as philosophers (especially phenomenologists) and science and technology
studies (STS) scholars have long shown, once we become habituated to a particular technology,
the device or interface itself recedes from conscious attention, allowing us to focus on the tasks
we are using it to accomplish.21 Think of a smartphone or computer: we pay little attention to
the devices themselves, or even to the way familiar websites or app interfaces are arranged.
Instead, after becoming acclimated to them, we attend to the information, entertainment, or
conveniences  they  offer  (Rosenberger,  2009).  Philosophers  refer  to  this  as  “technological
transparency”—the  fact  that  we  see,  hear,  or  otherwise  perceive  through  technologies—as
though they were clear, transparent—onto the perceptual objects they convey to us (Ihde, 1990;
Van Den Eede, 2011; Verbeek, 2005). Because this language of transparency can be confused
with the concept of transparency familiar from technology policy discussions, we might more
helpfully describe it as “invisibility” (Susser, 2019b). In addition to pervasive digital surveillance
making our decision-making vulnerabilities easy to detect, and digital platforms making them
easy to exploit, the ease with which our technologies become invisible to us—simply through
frequent use and habituation—means the influences they facilitate are often hidden, and thus
potentially manipulative.
Finally, although we focus primarily on the example of behavioural advertising to illustrate these
dynamics,  it  is  worth  emphasising  that  advertisers  are  not  the  only  ones  engaging  in
manipulative practices. In the realm of user interface/experience (UI/UX) design, increasing
attention  is  being  paid  to  so-called  “dark  patterns”—design  strategies  that  exploit  users’
decision-making vulnerabilities to nudge them into acting against their interests (or, at least,
acting in the interests of the website or app), such as requiring automatically-renewing paid
subscriptions that begin after an initial free trial period (Brignull, 2013; Gray, Kou, Battles,
Hoggatt, & Toombs, 2018; Murgia, 2019; Singer, 2016). Though many of these strategies are as
old  as  the  internet  and  not  all  rise  to  the  level  of  manipulation—sometimes  overtly
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inconveniencing users, rather than hiding their intentions—their growing prevalence has led
some to call for legislation banning them (Bartz, 2019).
Worries about online manipulation have also been raised in the context of gig economy services,
such as Uber and Lyft (Veen, Goods, Josserand, & Kaine, 2017). While these platforms market
themselves  as  freer,  more  flexible  alternatives  to  traditional  jobs,  providing  reliable  and
consistent service to customers requires maintaining some amount of control over workers.
However, without access to the traditional managerial controls of the office or factory floor, gig
economy firms turn to “algorithmic management” strategies, such as notifications, customer
satisfaction ratings, and other forms of soft control enabled through their apps (Rosenblat &
Stark, 2016). Uber, for example, rather than requesting (or demanding) that workers put in
longer hours, prompts drivers trying to exit the app with a reminder about their progress toward
some earnings goal, exploiting the desire to continue making progress toward that goal; Lyft
issues game-like “challenges” to drivers and stars and badges for accomplishing them (Mason,
2018; Scheiber, 2017).
In their current form, not all such practices necessarily manipulate—people are savvy, and many
likely understand what they are facing. These examples are important, however, because they
illustrate our present trajectory. Growing reliance on digital tools in all parts of our lives—tools
that constantly record, aggregate, and analyse information about us—means we are revealing
more  and  more  about  our  individual  and  shared  vulnerabilities.  The  digital  platforms  we
interact  with are increasingly  capable  of  exploiting those insights  to  nudge and shape our
choices,  at  home,  in  the  workplace,  and  in  the  public  sphere.  And  the  more  we  become
habituated to these systems, the less attention we pay to them.
2. THE HARM(S) OF ONLINE MANIPULATION
With this picture in hand, the question becomes: what exactly is the harm that results from
influencing people  in  this  way?  Why should we be  worried about  technological  mediation
rendering us so susceptible to manipulative influence? In our view, there are several harms, but
each flows from the same place—manipulation violates its target’s autonomy.
The notion of autonomy points to an individual’s capacity to make meaningfully independent
decisions. As Joseph Raz puts it: “(t)he ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that
people should make their own lives” (Raz, 1986, p. 369). Making one’s own life means freely
facing both existential choices, like whom to spend one’s life with or whether to have children,
and pedestrian, everyday ones. And facing them freely means having the opportunity to think
about and deliberate over one’s options, considering them against the backdrop of one’s beliefs,
desires, and commitments, and ultimately deciding for reasons one recognises and endorses as
one’s own, absent unwelcome influence (J. P. Christman, 2009; Oshana, 2015; Veltman & Piper,
2014).  Autonomy  is  in  many  ways  the  guiding  normative  principle  of  liberal  democratic
societies. It is because we think individuals can and should govern themselves that we value our
capacity to collectively and democratically self-govern.
Philosophers sometimes operationalise the notion of autonomy by distinguishing between its
competency and authenticity conditions (J. P. Christman, 2009, p. 155f). In the first place, being
autonomous means having the cognitive, psychological, social, and emotional competencies to
think  through  one’s  choices,  form  intentions  about  them,  and  act  on  the  basis  of  those
intentions.  Second,  it  means  that  upon critical  reflection  one  identifies  with  one’s  values,
Technology, autonomy, and manipulation
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 9 June 2019 | Volume 8 | Issue 2
desires,  and  goals,  and  endorses  them authentically  as  one’s  own.  Of  course,  many  have
criticised such conceptions of autonomy as overly rationalistic and implausibly demanding,
arguing that we rarely decide in this way. We are emotional actors and creatures of habit, they
argue, socialised and enculturated into specific ways of choosing that we almost never reflect
upon or endorse. But we understand autonomy broadly—our conception of deliberation includes
not  only  beliefs  and  desires,  but  also  emotions,  convictions,  and  experiences,  and  critical
reflection can be counterfactual (we must in principle be able to critically reflect on and endorse
our motivations for acting, but we need not actually reflect on each and every move we make).
In addition to rejecting overly demanding and rationalistic conceptions of autonomy, we also
reject  overly  atomistic  ones.  In  our  view,  autonomous  persons  are  socially,  culturally,
historically, and politically situated. Which is to say, we acknowledge the “intersubjective and
social dimensions of selfhood and identity for individual autonomy and moral and political
agency” (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p. 4).22 Though social contexts can constrain our choices,
by conditioning us to believe and behave in stereotypical ways (as, for example, in the case of
gendered social expectations), it is also our social contexts that bestow value on autonomy,
teaching us what it means to make independent decisions, and providing us with rich sets of
options from which to choose. Moreover, it is crucial for present purposes that we emphasise
our understanding of autonomy as more than an individual good—it is an essential social and
political good too. Individuals express their autonomy across a variety of social contexts, from
the home to the marketplace to  the political  sphere.  Democratic  institutions are meant to
register and reflect the autonomous political decisions individuals make. Disrupting individual
autonomy is thus more than an ethical concern; it has social and political import.
Against  this  picture of  autonomy and its  value,  we can more carefully  explain why online
manipulation poses such a grave threat. To manipulate someone is, again, to covertly influence
them, to intentionally alter their decision-making process without their conscious awareness.
Doing so undermines the target’s autonomy in two ways: first, it can lead them to act toward
ends they haven’t chosen, and second, it can lead them to act for reasons not authentically their
own.
To see the first problem, consider examples of targeted advertising in the commercial sphere.
Here, the aim of manipulators is fairly straightforward: they want people to buy things. Rather
than  simply  put  products  on  display,  however,  advertisers  can  construct  decision-making
environments—choice architectures—that subtly tempt or seduce shoppers to purchase their
wares, and at the highest possible price (Calo, 2014). A variety of strategies might be deployed,
from pointing out that one’s friends have purchased the item to countdown clocks that pressure
one to act before some offer expires, the goal being to hurry, evade, or undermine deliberation,
and  thus  to  encourage  decisions  that  may  or  may  not  align  with  an  individual’s  deeper,
reflective, self-chosen ends and values.
Of course, these strategies are familiar from non-digital contexts; all commercial advertising
(digital or otherwise) functions in part to induce consumers to buy things, and worries about
manipulative  ads  emerged  long  before  advertising  moved  online.23  Equally,  not  all
advertising—perhaps  not  even  all  targeted  advertising—involves  manipulation.  Purely
informational ads displayed to audiences actively seeking out related products and services (e.g.,
online banner ads displaying a doctor’s contact information shown to visitors to a health-related
website) are unlikely to covertly influence their targets. Worries about manipulation arise in
cases  where  advertisements  are  sneaky—which  is  to  say,  where  their  effects  are  achieved
covertly. If, for example, the doctor was a psychiatrist, his advertisements were shown to people
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suspected of suffering from depression, and only at the specific times of day they were thought
to  be  most  afflicted,  our  account  would  offer  grounds  for  condemning  such  tactics  as
manipulative.
It might also be the case that manipulation is not a binary phenomenon. We are the objects of
countless influence campaigns and we understand some of them more than others; perhaps we
ought to say that they are more or less manipulative in equal measure. On such a view, online
targeted  (or  “behavioural”)  advertising  could  be  understood  as  exacerbating  manipulative
dynamics common to other forms of advertising, by making the tweaks to individual choice
architectures more subtle,  and the seductions and temptations that result from them more
difficult to resist (Yeung, 2017). Worse still, the fluidity and porousness of online environments
makes it easy for marketers to conflate other distinct contexts with shopping, further blurring a
person’s reasoning about whether they truly want to make some purchase. For example, while
chatting with friends over social media or searching for some place to eat, an ad may appear,
thus requiring the target to juggle several tasks—in this case, communication and information
retrieval—along with deliberation over whether or not to respond to the marketing ploy, thus
diminishing the target’s ability to sustain focus on any of the them. This problem is especially
clearly illustrated by so-called “native advertising” (advertisements designed to look like user-
generated,  non-commercial  content).  Such  advertisements  are  a  kind  of  Trojan  horse,
intentionally conflating commercial and non-commercial activities in an attempt to undermine
our capacity for focused, careful deliberation.
In the philosophical language introduced above, these strategies challenge both autonomy’s
competency and authenticity conditions. By deliberately and covertly engineering our choice
environments to steer our decision-making, online manipulation threatens our competency to
deliberate  about  our  options,  form intentions  about  them,  and  act  on  the  basis  of  those
intentions.  And  since,  as  we’ve  seen,  manipulative  practices  often  work  by  targeting  and
exploiting our decision-making vulnerabilities—concealing their effects, leaving us unaware of
the influence on our decision-making process—they also challenge our capacity to reflect on and
endorse our reasons for acting as authentically on our own. Online manipulation thus harms us
both by  inducing us  to  act  toward ends not  of  our  choosing and for  reasons we haven’t
endorsed.
Importantly, undermining personal autonomy in the ways just described can lead to further
harms. First, since autonomous individuals are wont to protect (or at least to try and protect)
their own interests, we can reasonably expect that undermining people’s autonomy will lead, in
many cases, to a diminishment of those interests. Losing the ability to look out for ourselves is
unlikely to leave us better off in the long run. This harm—e.g., being tricked into buying things
we don’t need or paying more for them than we otherwise would—is well described by those who
have analysed the problem of online manipulation in the commercial sphere (Calo, 2014; Nadler
& McGuigan, 2018; Zarsky, 2006; Zarsky, 2019). And it is a serious harm, which we would do
well to take seriously, especially given the fact that law and policy around information and
internet practices (at least in the US) assume that individuals are for the most part capable of
safeguarding their interests (Solove, 2013). However, it is equally important to see that this
harm  to  welfare  is  derivative  of  the  deeper  harm  to  autonomy.  Attempting  to  “protect
consumers” from threats to their economic or other interests, without addressing the more
fundamental threat to their autonomy, is thus to treat the symptoms without addressing the
cause.
To  bring  this  into  sharper  relief,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  even  purely  beneficent
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manipulation is harmful. Indeed, it is harmful to manipulate someone even in an effort to lead
them more effectively toward their own self-chosen ends. That is because the fundamental harm
of  manipulation  is  to  the  process  of  decision-making,  not  its  outcome.  A  well-meaning,
paternalistic manipulator, who subtly induces his target to eat better food, exercise, and work
hard, makes his target better off in one sense—he is healthier and perhaps more materially well-
off—but it harms him as well by rendering him opaque to himself. Imagine if some bad habit,
which someone had spent their whole life attempting to overcome, one day, all of a sudden,
disappeared. They would be happy, of course, to be rid of the habit, but they might also be
deeply confused and suspicious about the source of the change. As T.M. Scanlon writes, “I want
to choose the furniture for my own apartment, pick out the pictures for the walls, and even write
my own lectures despite the fact that these things might be done better by a decorator, art
expert, or talented graduate student. For better or worse, I want these things to be produced by
and reflect my own taste, imagination, and powers of discrimination and analysis. I feel the
same way, even more strongly, about important decisions affecting my life in larger terms: what
career to follow, where to work, how to live” (Scanlon, 1988).
Having said that, we have not demonstrated that manipulation is necessarily wrong in every
case—only that it always carries a harm. One can imagine cases where the harm to autonomy is
outweighed by the benefit to welfare. (For example, a case where someone’s life is in immediate
danger, and the only way to save them is by manipulating them.) But such cases are likely few
and far between. What is so worrying about online manipulation is precisely its banality—the
fact that it threatens to become a regular part of the fabric of everyday experience. As Jeremy
Waldron argues, if  we allow that to happen, our lives will  be drained of something deeply
important: “What becomes of the self-respect we invest in our own willed actions, flawed and
misguided though they often are, when so many of our choices are manipulated to promote what
someone else sees (perhaps rightly) as our best interest?” (Waldron, 2014) That we also lack
reason to believe online manipulators really do have our best interests at heart is only more
reason to resist them.
Finally,  beyond  the  harm  to  individuals,  manipulation  promises  a  collective  harm.  By
threatening our autonomy it threatens democracy as well. For autonomy is writ small what
democracy is writ large—the capacity to self-govern. It is only because we believe individuals can
make meaningfully independent decisions that we value institutions designed to register and
reflect  them.  As  the  Cambridge  Analytica  case—and  the  public  outcry  in  response  to
it—demonstrates, online manipulation in the political sphere threatens to undermine these core
collective  values.  The  problem of  online  manipulation  is,  therefore,  not  simply  an  ethical
problem; it is a social and political one too.
3. TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMY
If one accepts the arguments advanced thus far, an obvious response is that we need to devise
law and policy capable of preventing and mitigating manipulative online practices. We agree
that we do. But that response is not sufficient—the question for policymakers is not simply how
to mitigate online manipulation, but how to strengthen autonomy in the digital age. In making
this claim, we join our voices with a growing chorus of scholars and activists—like Frischmann,
Selinger,  and  Zuboff—working  to  highlight  the  corrosive  effects  of  digital  technologies  on
autonomy.  Meeting  these  challenges  requires  more  than  consumer  protection—it  requires
creating  the  positive  conditions  necessary  for  supporting  individual  and  collective  self-
determination.
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We don’t pretend to have a comprehensive solution to these deep and complex problems, but
some  suggestions  follow  from  our  brief  discussion.  It  should  be  noted  that  these
suggestions—like the discussion, above, that prompted them—are situated firmly in the terrain
of contemporary liberal political discourse, and those convinced that online manipulation poses
a significant threat (especially some European readers) may be struck by how moderate our
responses  are.  While  we are  not  opposed to  more radical  interventions,  we formulate  our
analysis using the conceptual and normative frameworks familiar to existing policy discussions
in hopes of having an impact on them.
CURTAIL DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE
Data, as Tal Zarsky writes, is the “fuel” powering online manipulation (2019, p. 186). Without
the detailed profiles cataloguing our preferences, interests,  habits,  and so on, the ability of
would-be  manipulators  to  identify  our  weaknesses  and  vulnerabilities  would  be  vastly
diminished, and so too their capacity to leverage them to their ends. Of course, the call to curtail
digital surveillance is nothing new. Privacy scholars and advocates have been raising alarms
about the ills of surveillance for half a century or more. Yet, as Zarsky argues, manipulation
arguments could add to the “analytic and doctrinal arsenal of measures which enable legal
intervention in the new digital environment” (2019, p. 185). Furthermore, outcry over apparent
online manipulation in both the commercial and political spheres appears to be generating
momentum behind new policy interventions to combat such strategies. In the US, a number of
states have recently passed or are considering passing new privacy legislation, and the U.S.
Congress appears to be weighing new federal privacy legislation as well. (“Congress Is Trying to
Create a Federal Privacy Law”, 2019; Merken, 2019). And, of course, all of that takes place on
the heels of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) taking effect in Europe, which
places new limits on when and what kinds of data can be collected about European citizens and
by firms operating on European soil.24 To curb manipulation and strengthen autonomy online,
efforts to curtail digital surveillance ought to be redoubled.
PROBLEMATISE PERSONALISATION
When asked to justify collecting so much data about us, data collectors routinely argue that the
information is  needed in  order  to  personalise  their  services  to  the  needs  and interests  of
individual  users.  Mark  Zuckerberg,  for  example,  attempted  recently  to  explain  Facebook’s
business model in the pages of the Wall Street Journal:  “People consistently tell  us that if
they're going to see ads, they want them to be relevant,” he wrote. “That means we need to
understand their interests” (2019).25 Personalisation seems, on the face of it, like an unalloyed
good.  Who wouldn’t  prefer  a  personalised  experience  to  a  generic  one?  Yet  research  into
different forms of personalisation suggests that individualising—personalising—our experiences
can carry with it significant risks.
These worries came to popular attention with Eli Pariser’s book Filter Bubble (2011), which
argued forcefully (though not without challenge) that the construction of increasingly singular,
individualised experiences,  means at  the same time the loss of  common, shared ones,  and
describes  the detriments  of  that  transformation to  both individual  and collective  decision-
making.26 In addition to personalised information environments—Pariser’s focus—technological
advances enable things like personalised pricing - sometimes called “dynamic pricing” or “price
discrimination” (Calo, 2014) and personalised work scheduling - or “just-in-time” scheduling
(De  Stefano,  2015).  For  the  reasons  discussed  above,  many  such  strategies  may  well  be
manipulative.  The  targeting  and  exploiting  of  individual  decision-making  vulnerabilities
enabled by digital  technologies—the potential  for online manipulation they create—gives us
reason to question whether the benefits of personalisation really outweigh the costs. At the very
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least,  we ought  not  to  uncritically  accept  personalisation as  a  rationale  for  increased data
collection, and we ought to approach with care (if not skepticism) the promise of an increasingly
personalised digital environment.
PROMOTE AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING
If the central problem of online manipulation is its hiddenness, then any response must involve
a drive toward increased awareness. The question is what form such awareness should take.
Yeung argues that the predominant vehicle for notifying individuals about information flows
and  data  practices—the  privacy  notice,  or  what  is  often  called  “notice-and-consent”—is
insufficient (2017). Indeed, merely notifying someone that they are the target of manipulation is
not enough to neutralise its effects. Doing so would require understanding not only that one is
the target of manipulation, but also who the manipulator is, what strategies they are deploying,
and why. Given the well-known “transparency paradox”, according to which we are bound to
either deprive users of relevant information (in an attempt to be succinct) or overwhelm them
with it (in an attempt to be thorough), there is little reason to believe standard forms of notice
alone can equip users to face the challenges of online manipulation.27
Furthermore, the problem of online manipulation runs deeper than any particular manipulative
practice.  What  worries  many  people  is  the  fact  that  manipulative  strategies,  like  targeted
advertising, are becoming basic features of the digital world—so commonplace as to escape
notice or mention.28 In the same way that machine learning and artificial intelligence tools have
quickly  and  quietly  been  delegated  vast  decision-making  authorities  in  a  variety  of
contemporary contexts and institutions, and in response, scholars and activists have mounted
calls to make their decision-making processes more explainable, transparent, and accountable,
so too must we give people tools to understand and manage a digital environment designed to
shape and influence them.29
ATTEND TO CONTEXT
Finally, it is important to recognise that moral intuitions about manipulation are indexed to
social context. Which is to say, we are willing to tolerate different levels of outside influence on
our  decision-making  in  different  decision-making  spheres.  As  relatively  lax  commercial
advertising regulations indicate, we are—at least in the US—willing to accept a fair amount of
interference  in  the  commercial  sphere.  By  contrast,  somewhat  more  stringent  regulations
around elections and campaign advertising suggest  that  we are less  willing to accept  such
interference  in  the  realm  of  politics.30  Responding  to  the  threats  of  online  manipulation
therefore requires sensitivity to where—in which spheres of life—we encounter them.
CONCLUSION
The idea that technological advancements bring with them new arrangements of power is, of
course,  nothing  new.  That  online  manipulation  threatens  to  subordinate  the  interests  of
individuals to those of data collectors and their clients is thus, in one respect, a familiar (if
nonetheless troubling) problem. What we hope to have shown, however, is that the threat of
online manipulation is deeper, more insidious, than that. Being steered or controlled, outside
our conscious awareness, violates our autonomy, our capacity to understand and author our
own lives. If the tools that facilitate such control are left unchecked, it will be to our individual
and collective detriment. As we’ve seen, information technology is in many ways an ideal vehicle
for these forms of control, but that does not mean that they are inevitable. Combating online
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manipulation  requires  both  depriving  it  of  personal  data—the  oxygen  enabling  it—and
empowering its targets with awareness, understanding, and savvy about the forces attempting to
influence them.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Richards describes this influence as “persuasion” and “subtle forms of control”. In our view,
for reasons discussed below, the subtler forms of influence ought really to be called
“manipulation”.
2. For a wide-ranging review of the scholarly literature on targeted advertising, see (Boerman,
Kruikemeier, & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2017).
3. See, for example, Zarsky gestures at there being more at stake than consumer interests, but he
explicitly declines to develop the point, framing the problem instead as one of consumer
protection. See (2006; 2019)
4. Which is not to say that no one saw this coming. As far back as 1967, Alan Westin warned
about “the entire range of forthcoming devices, techniques, and substances that enter the mind
to implant influences or extract data” and their application “in commerce or politics” (Westin,
2015, p. 331). See also (Tufekci, 2014; Zittrain, 2014).
5. Frischmann and Selinger write: “Across cultures and generations, humans have engineered
themselves and their built social environments to sustain capacities for thinking, the ability to
socialize and relate to each other, free will, autonomy, and agency, as well as other core
capabilities. […T]hey are at risk of being whittled away through modern forms of techno-social
engineering.” (2018, p. 271). And Zuboff argues that the behaviour modifications characteristic
of surveillance capitalism “sacrifice our right to the future tense, which comprises our will to
will, our autonomy, our decision rights, our privacy, and, indeed, our human natures” (2019, p.
347).
6. As Frischmann and Selinger write, “We are fundamentally techno-social animals” (2018, p.
271).
7. For a more fully developed and defended version of our account, see Susser, Roessler, and
Nissenbaum (2018).
8. (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018). See also the many excellent reports from the Data & Society
Research Institute’s “Media Manipulation” project: https://datasociety.net/research/media-
manipulation/
9. Examples from Noggle (2018b).
10. The term “persuasion” is sometimes used in a broader sense, as a synonym for “influence”.
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Here we use it in the narrower sense of rational persuasion, since our goal is precisely to
distinguish between different forms of influence.
11. Assuming we ever do learn that we have been manipulated. Presumably we often do not.
12. As Luc Bovens writes about nudges (discussed below), such strategies “typically work better
in the dark” (2009, p. 209).
13. The classic formulation of these ideas comes from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
summarised in (Kahneman, 2013). See also (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
14. Writing about manipulation in 1978, Joel Rudinow observed: “Weaknesses are rarely
displayed; they are betrayed. Since our weaknesses, in addition to making us vulnerable, are
generally repugnant to us, we generally do our best to conceal them, not least from ourselves.
Consequently too few people are insightful enough into or familiar enough with enough other
people to make the use of resistible incentives a statistically common form of manipulation. In
addition we are not always so situated as to be able genuinely to offer someone the incentive
which we believe will best suit our manipulative aims. Just as often it becomes necessary to
deceive someone in order to play on his weakness. Thus it is only to be expected that deception
plays a role in the great majority of cases of manipulation.” (Rudinow, 1978, p. 347) As we’ll see
below, it is precisely the limitations confronting the would-be manipulator in 1978, which
Rudinow identifies, that thanks to technology have since been overcome.
15. Thaler and Sunstein refer to this as “libertarian paternalism” (2008).
16. Our thanks to a reviewer of this essay for the term “person-specific vulnerability.”
17. In fact, while we are all susceptible to the kinds of cognitive biases discussed by behavioral
economists to some degree, we are not all susceptible to each bias to the same degree
(Rachlinski, R; Stanovich & West, 1998). Empirical evidence suggests that individual differences
in personality (Franken & Muris, 2005), cultural background (Levinson & Peng, 2007), and
mood (Blumenthal, 2005), among others, can modulate how individuals are impacted by
particular biases. It is not difficult to imagine digital tools detecting these differences and
leveraging them to structure particular interventions.
18. Cambridge Analytica’s then-CEO Alexander Nix discusses these tactics here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n8Dd5aVXLCc. Research suggests such tactics are
plausible, see Matz, Kosinski, Nave, and Stillwell (2017).
19. For a deeper discussion about vulnerability, its varieties, and the ways vulnerabilities can be
leveraged by digital tools, see Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum (2018).
20. See also Susser (2019b).
21. For an excellent discussion of the different ways this idea has been elaborated by a variety of
philosophers and STS scholars, see Van Den Eede (2011).
22. It is worth noting, however: just because individuals and their capacities are inextricably
social, that does not mean autonomy is only possible in egalitarian social contexts. See Anderson
and Honneth (2005).
23. “While much about digital advertising appears revolutionary, it would be wrong to accept
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the notion of customer surveillance as a modern phenomenon. Although the internet’s
technological advances have taken advertising in new directions and the practice of ‘data-
mining’ to almost incomprehensible extremes, nearly all of what is transpiring reflects some of
the basic methods developed by marketers beginning a hundred years ago” (Stole, 2014).
24. See https://eugdpr.org
25. Zuckerberg also cited needing user information for “security and operating our services”.
26. Some empirical researchers have expressed skepticism about the alleged harms of filter
bubbles, some even suggesting that they are beneficial (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Zuiderveen
Borgesius et al., 2016). Their findings, however, are far from conclusive.
27. On the “transparency paradox,” see Nissenbaum (2011). Though privacy notices are, in
themselves, insufficient for shielding individuals from the effects of online manipulation, that
does not mean that they are entirely without value. They might support individual autonomy,
even if they can’t guarantee it: see Susser (2019a).
28. For example, Marcella Vayena writes: “[N]ot just Cambridge Analytica, but most of the
current online ecosystem, is an arm’s race to the unconscious mind: notifications, microtargeted
ads, autoplay plugins, are all strategies designed to induce addictive behavior, hence to
manipulate” (Vayena, 2018).
29. For a helpful discussion about the calls for—and limits of—explainable artificial intelligence,
see (Selbst & Barocas, 2018)
30. In a longer version of this paper, we also consider online manipulation in the context of the
workplace. See Susser et al. (2018).
